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Rickard v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 120 Nev. Ad. Op. 54, 96 P.3d 743 (2004).1 
 
CIVIL LAW – CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
 
 On January 23, 1993, appellant David Rickard was involved in an incident at the 
Montgomery Ward store.  On April 20, 1993, he filed a complaint in the Clark County District 
Court alleging various claims against the store.  Approximately four years after the complaint 
was filed in court, Ward filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding with the United States 
Bankruptcy Court in the District of Delaware.  In accordance with federal bankruptcy law, 
Rickard’s action in the Nevada district court was stayed. 
 On August 25, 1998, Rickard filed a motion for relief from stay in order to further his 
action against Ward.  The bankruptcy court granted Rickard’s motion and on January 27, 1999, 
Rickard notified Ward that he had received relief from the stay.  Rickard then filed a motion for 
a trial with the district court.  The motion was unopposed and the district court entered its order 
setting a jury trial for August 3, 1999. 
 On July 23, 1999, Ward filed a motion to dismiss based on Rickard’s failure to bring the 
matter to trial within five years as required by NRCP 41(e).2  The motion was denied and Ward 
never took any further action on that motion.   
 On January 23, 2001, at a status check for Rickard’s case, the district court judge 
requested that the parties file points and authorities indicating all significant dates to help explain 
why the five-year rule had not run on Ward.  On April 19, 2001, the district court heard 
argument regarding dismissal of Rickard’s action pursuant to NRCP 41(e) and concluded that the 
five-year period had run as to Ward and dismissed Rickard’s case.  This appeal followed.  
 On appeal, Rickard asserted the primary theory that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)3, the 
five-year prescriptive period in NRCP 41(e) was tolled of the time period during which Ward 
was under the protection of the bankruptcy court.  The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that 
although 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) in itself does not toll the five-year period, there is no reason to 
distinguish between a court ordered stay and the automatic stay imposed by federal bankruptcy 
law under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  Therefore, Rickard’s claim was not tolled under NRCP 41(e). 
                                                 
1 By Amanda Yen 
2 NEV. R. CIV. P. 41(e) (2000) provides in pertinent part:  
 
Want of Prosecution…Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the 
court in which the same shall have been commenced or to which it may be transferred on motion 
of any party, or on the court’s own motion, after due notice to the parties, unless such action is 
brought to trial within five years after the plaintiff has filed his action, except where the parties 
have stipulated in writing that the time may be extended. 
 
3 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2000) states in pertinent part: 
 
[I]f applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an 
agreement fixes a period for commencing or continuing civil action in a court other than a 
bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, . . . and such period has not expired before the 
date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of (1) the end of 
such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of 
the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay. 
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue 
  
 Is the five-year prescriptive period under NRCP 41(e) tolled for the period that a stay is 
imposed by a debtor’s bankruptcy? 
 
Disposition 
 
 Yes.  There is no distinction between a court order stay which tolls the prescriptive period 
and the automatic stay imposed by federal bankruptcy law pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
 
Commentary 
 
State of the Law Before Rickard 
 
 Prior to Rickard, the Nevada Supreme Court had firmly established the purpose of the 
mandatory4 language of NRCP 41(e) which is to compel expeditious determinations of legitimate 
claims.5   
In Boren v. City of North Las Vegas6, the court considered the issue of whether a court 
ordered stay tolled NRCP 41(e)’s five-year prescriptive period.  The court determined that “[a]ny 
period during which the parties are prevented from bringing an action to trial by reason of a stay 
order shall not be computed in determining the five-year period of Rule 41(e).”7 
Therefore, the court established that although the prescriptive period provided by NRCP 
41(e) is mandatory, it can be tolled by a court ordered stay. 
 
Effect of Rickard on Current Law  
 
 The court in Rickard disagreed with appellant’s argument that NRCP 41(e)’s five-year 
period was tolled due to 11 U.S.C. § 108(c).  Yet, the court determined that any action based on a 
creditor’s liability can be tolled due to a different section of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a).   
 The court determined that section 108(c) is an exclusive provision of the bankruptcy code 
which deals with the effect of a bankruptcy filing on the running of statutes of limitation.  It 
further stated that Congress had enacted the section to prevent debtors who file bankruptcy in 
order to let the statute of limitations run, from using the expiration of the limitations period as a 
complete defense.8  By its terms, section 108(c) does not toll any applicable limitations period 
(i.e. NRCP 41(e)).  The court found that the section’s language “merely incorporates suspensions 
of deadlines that are expressly provided in other federal or state statutes.”9 
                                                 
4 Morgan v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 118 Nev. 315, 320, 43 P.3d 1036, 1039 (2002) (declaring “[t]he language of 
NRCP 41(e) is mandatory”). 
5 Baker v. Noback, 112 Nev. 1106, 1110, 922 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1996). 
6 Boren, 98 Nev. 5, 638 P.2d 404 (1982). 
7 Id. at 6, 638 P.2d at 405. 
8 In Re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 566 (2d. Cir. 1989). 
9 Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 The court then determined that another section of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a) did toll the prescriptive period.  Section 362(a) imposes an automatic stay of any action to 
collect on liability of a debtor.  The court came to this equitable conclusion based on previous 
case law which stated that a court ordered stay can toll the prescriptive period required in NRCP 
41(e).  The court saw no reason why a court ordered stay and the automatic stay imposed by 
federal bankruptcy law should be treated differently.  
 
Survey of the Law in Other Jurisdictions 
 
 The court’s conclusion is consistent with holdings in other jurisdictions which have held 
that actions filed by creditors against a debtor are tolled due to the automatic stay entered in the 
debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).10   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although the five-year prescriptive period required by NRCP 41(e) is not tolled by 11 
U.S.C. § 108(c), the time period is tolled by the automatic stay of actions imposed by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a). This decision was based on current court decisions which have held that the 
prescriptive period is tolled by a court ordered stay.  The Nevada Supreme Court determined that 
there are no differences between a court ordered stay and the automatic stay imposed by federal 
bankruptcy law.  
   
                                                 
10 See Kertesz v. Ostrovsky, 115 Cal. App. 4th 369 (2004); Lucas v. Integrated Health Servs. of Lester, Inc., 2004 
Ga. App. LEXIS 748 (2004). 
